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Various groups have demonstrated that antineutrino monitoring can be successful in assessing the
plutonium content in water-cooled nuclear reactors for nonproliferation applications. New reactor
designs and concepts incorporate nontraditional fuels types and chemistry. Understanding how these
properties affect the antineutrino emission from a reactor can extend the applicability of antineutrino
monitoring. Thorium molten salt reactors (MSR) breed 233U, that if diverted constitute a direct use
material as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The antineutrino spectrum
from the fission of 233U has been estimated for the first time, and the feasibility of detecting the
diversion of 8 kg of 233U, within a 30 day timeliness goal has been evaluated. The antineutrino
emission from a thorium reactor operating under normal conditions is compared to a diversion
scenario by evaluating the daily antineutrino count rate and the energy spectrum of the detected
antineutrinos at a 25 meter standoff. It was found that the diversion of a significant quantity of
233U could not be detected within the current IAEA timeliness detection goal using either tests. A
rate-time based analysis exceeded the timeliness goal by 23 days, while a spectral based analysis
exceeds this goal by 31 days.
I. INTRODUCTION
The accident that occurred at the Fukushima-Daiichi
nuclear power plant following the 2011 earthquake and
subsequent tsunami in Japan led to an international ef-
fort to increase the development of accident tolerant nu-
clear fuels specifically to withstand a core meltdown in
the case of a beyond-design-basis event such as a loss
of coolant. This has led to a revival in the interest in
thorium molten salt reactor (MSR) designs. Despite the
improvement to reactor safety, the production and on-
line reprocessing of 233Pa which decays into 233U creates
a state-sponsored proliferation risk. Current IAEA meth-
ods used to detect the divergence of nuclear material are
relatively intrusive and cannot directly measure the fis-
sile inventory of the reactor [1]. Moreover, the safeguards
approach for this new class of reactors has not yet been
defined. Groups at Lawrence Livermore National Labo-
ratory (LLNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)
have shown that using antineutrino detectors provide a
remote and non-intrusive method to observe the diver-
sion of nuclear material [2]. In this paper the feasibility
of using antineutrino monitoring to detect the diversion
of 233U from a thorium MSR is evaluated.
II. BACKGROUND
Antineutrinos are weakly interacting neutral particles
produced from the beta decay of neutron rich fission
products. Unlike neutrons, beta particles, and gamma
∗ Correspondence to: University of California,4155 Etchev-
erry Hall, MC 1730, Berkeley,CA 94720-1730; Email:
tomi90@berkeley.edu
rays; antineutrinos can be detected from well outside the
reactor core because of their low interaction cross section.
About six antineutrinos are produced from each fission
resulting in an antineutrino flux of about 1021νe/s from
a 1 GW reactor. Antineutrino monitoring of traditional
nuclear reactors uses the varying spectral contributions of
fission products from 235U and 239Pu over time to make
the detection of materials diversion feasible. When these
isotopes fission they produce different beta emitters with
various yields. The antineutrino spectrum for each fissile
isotope is an combination of the antineutrino spectra of
individual fission products, with each contribution fixed
by the fission yield and branching ratio. As a result, each
fissile isotope has a distinct antineutrino spectra shape
and amplitude making its growth or depletion potentially
accessible through antineutrino monitoring. For thorium
reactors the difference in antineutrino spectra from 233U
and 235U, the most prominent fissile isotopes, allows for
diversion detection.
A. Antineutrino Detection
Antineutrinos can be detected through their inter-
actions with quasi-free protons in a liquid scintillating
medium, using the inverse beta decay process shown in
Eq. 1.
νe + p −→ e+ + n Q = −1.804MeV (1)
The threshold for this reaction is 1.804 MeV, limiting de-
tection of antineutrinos to those above that energy. In
a liquid scintillator detector, the positron created from
this reaction will slow in the detector and annihilate with
an electron. The positron will deposit almost all of its
energy at the end of its trajectory, and because subse-
quent annihilation occurs instantaneously, the energy of
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2TABLE I. Summary of detector parameters used in this anal-
ysis.
Property Quantity
Target Mass 3.6 Tons
Efficiency 39.2 ±4.7%
Energy Resolution 20%√
E/(MeV )
Fiducial Volume 100%
Standoff 25 Meters
Overburden 25 M.W.E
Signal to Background 1262/200
the positron and the gamma rays emitted from annihi-
lation create an indistinguishable prompt signal. In a
gadolinium-doped scintillator, the neutron captures on
the Gd dopant within a few tens of microseconds, de-
pending on the dopant concentration, a delayed signal
from the resulting 8 MeV gamma ray cascade is formed.
These two signals, detected in close time coincidence de-
fines an antineutrino event.
In the present work, the antineutrino emission from
the reactor is studied using a design similiar to that of a
detector developed and tested at LLNL [3]. The detector
is assumed deployed at a 25 meter standoff, 10 meters
below the surface, equivalent to a water overburden of
about 25 meters. At these depths a previous iteration
of this detector, SONGS1, experienced a singles and de-
layed coincidence background count rate of 3725 and 105
counts a day respectively for a target mass of 0.64 tons
[2]. For a 3.6 ton detector the uncorrelated daily back-
ground rate is assumed to be 21,000 counts. This un-
correlated background may be subtracted, thereby con-
tributing a 150 count uncertainty on the signal. Due to
significant improvements in background rejection from
the muon veto system, larger fiducial volume, and inter-
event timing cuts the correlated background is found to
contribute an additional 200 counts per day [3]. It is as-
sumed these counts are evenly distributed within 500 keV
energy bins. While the backgrounds cannot be precisely
known without an actual deployment, these estimates
represent a reasonable extrapolation based on the mea-
sured properties of the 3.6 ton detector, and the known
signal and background for the SONGS detector. Other
experiments have shown similar signal to background ra-
tios [4].
Although the antineutrino flux from the reactor is
about 1021 νe/s, the low interaction cross section for this
reaction (σ = 9.52E2 × 10−44cm2) significantly reduces
the number of events detected [5]. Figure 1 gives a vi-
sual representation of the interaction cross section and
antineutrino spectra effect on antineutrino detection for
235U and 233U fissions, as well as the ratio between the
two. The falling antineutrino spectrum coupled with the
quadratic increase in the interaction cross section results
in a unique detection spectrum for each fissionable iso-
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FIG. 1. (Color online).(a) Visualization of antineutrino flux,
(b)inverse beta decay cross section, and (c) detected antineu-
trino events from 235U and 233U fissions (top) shown with 1σ.
Units for the inverse beta decay cross section and the detected
antineutrino events are in arbitrary units to effectively com-
municate the effects of physical properties on the detected
spectrum. Oscillation effects are neglected. Ratio of the 233U
and 235U antineutrino spectra are shown (bottom). A de-
tailed calculation of the 233U antineutrino spectrum shown
above is discussed in Section III.
tope [6]. The sum of their antineutrino spectra can be
used to estimate the inventory of fissionable content in a
given reactor throughout the cycle.
B. Thorium Reactors
A thorium MSR core consists of a seed and blanket sep-
arated by a graphite moderator. Neutrons emitted from
fissile material contained in the seed, converts 232Th in
the blanket to 233U. At the beginning of the reactor life-
time the seed is comprised of low enriched uranium (20%
235U) ; over time enough 233U is bred through the blanket
to be used in the seed. 233U is formed from neutron cap-
ture by 232Th and subsequent beta decay chains shown
below:
232Th+n→233 Th β−−−−−−→
22.3min
233Pa
β−−−−−−−→
26.97days
233U (2)
Online reprocessing occurs in the blanket to separate
233Pa and 233U from 232Th. As shown in Figure 2, salt
from the blanket undergoes flourination to re-inject ura-
nium into the core, and minimize reactivity losses. 233Pa
is then extracted from the salt, and allowed to decay in
a sub-critical storage containment. Another reduction
process is used to extract 232Th and replace it in the
blanket. After 233Pa decays to 233U, it is reintroduced
into the core [7]. Because the conversion ratio for 232Th
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FIG. 2. (Color online). Flow diagram of a thorium MSR
reprocessing unit showing the movement of fissile and fertile
material. The introduction of thorium and enriched uranium
come from external processes.
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FIG. 3. (Color online). Fission fraction of fissile isotopes
throughout the reactor’s lifetime with associated uncertanties
from simulation. At the beginning of the reactor’s lifetime,
most of the fissions comes from 235U. Over time the contri-
bution of 233U to the fission fraction increases until it reaches
an equilibrium.
and 233U is less than one for this reactor, enriched ura-
nium is also added to the seed as makeup fuel. If a state
diverts 233Pa before its daughter product can be reintro-
duced into the core, enough 233U could be proliferated to
construct a nuclear device.
The reactor used in this analysis is a 500 MWth ther-
mal thorium MSR taken from the Sandia National Lab-
oratories Nuclear Fuel Cycle Catalog [8]. The fuel evo-
lution was calculated using ORIGEN 2.2, a reactor neu-
tronics software to simulate the isotopic inventory of nu-
clear systems [9]. The fissile inventory of the core over
the reactor’s lifetime is shown in Figure 3. The inability
to fully refuel the core and the material degradation from
using molten salts reduces the lifetime of these reactors
to a few decades.
III. ANTINEUTRINO EMISSION
To determine the expected antineutrino emission from
a thorium MSR, the antineutrino spectra for 233,235,238U
and 239,241Pu must be evaluated. Because of the graphite
moderator the fast neutron flux in the blanket is negli-
gible. As a result, fissile actinides such as 232Th and
233Pa do not contribute to the antineutrino emission from
the reactor. The antineutrino spectra from 235, 238U and
239, 241Pu have been previously determined by converting
the measured electron emission following neutron irradi-
ation at ILL and FRM II [10, 11]; while the antineutrino
spectra from the fission of 233U is not available in open
literature, and must be estimated through an aggregate
summation method.
The antineutrino spectrum from the fission of an iso-
tope, N(Ev) ,is an combination of spectra, Pv(Ev, E
i
0, Z)
, from its fission products. In this work, the fission yield
and uncertainties was taken from ENDF-349 [12].
N(Ev) =
∑
n
Yn(Z,A, t)×
∑
i
bn,i(E
i
0)Pv(Ev, E
i
0, Z) (3)
Where Yn(Z,A, t) is the number of beta decays per sec-
ond for a given isotope (Z,A); bn,i(E
i
0) is the branching
ratio to an excited state with the electron energy spec-
trum endpoint:
Ei0 = Qn − Eiex (4)
Here Qnis the Q value for the beta decay of isotope
(Z,A), and Eiexis the excitation energy in the daugh-
ter nucleus (Z + 1, A). The decay information for all the
fission products was taken from the Evaluated Nuclear
Structure Data Files [13]. The fission products for which
the decay data was absent were neglected because they
only represented less than 10-6 of the cumulative fission
yield, or had such large Q values that these nuclei would
be beta delayed neutron candidates such that the an-
tineutrinos emitted from their decay would be less than
3 MeV (below the energy range of this assessment).
The spectrum shape factor, Pv(Ev, E0, Z) shown in
Equation 5 is derived from the phase space relationship
between the electron and antineutrino and the normal-
ization constant, k , for each branch; as well as the
Fermi Coulomb function, F (E0, Z), which accounts for
the Coulomb attraction between the emitted electron and
daughter nucleus is shown in Equation 6 [14]. An allowed
Gamow-Teller spectral shape was assumed for all beta
decays.
Pv = k E
2
v(E0 − Ev)2F (E0, Z) (5)
Additional corrections to the antineutrino spectra in-
clude both the electromagnetic and weak-interaction fi-
nite size correction, the radiative corrections, and the
weak magnetism correction [6, 10, 15, 16]. Effects of the
screening correction, were neglected do to its small con-
tribution to the antineutrino shape [10]. Previous assess-
ments show multiple methods of evaluating the spectrum
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FIG. 4. (Color online). Comparison of the antineutrino spectra from the fission of 235, 238U and 239, 241Pu determined from
the summation method (blue) and the converted beta measurements at ILL and FRM II (black). The antineutrino spectra for
238U was only evaluated between 3-7.5 MeV [10, 11]
introduces disagreements in the antineutrino spectrum
from fission [17]. To quantify the systematic uncertainty
in the aggregate spectra, the antineutrino spectra from
235, 238U and 239, 241Pu were calculated in the same man-
ner and compared to the ILL and FRM II results [10, 11].
A comparison of the antineutrino spectra from the exper-
iments at ILL and FRM II compared to those determined
using the summation method is shown in Figure 4. The
spectra evaluated in this work show a 10% deficit from
2-4 MeV, and an excess between 4-7 MeV. The result-
ing 233U antineutrino spectrum is shown in Figure 1 and
presented in Table II.
IV. DIVERSION SCENARIO
Once the antineutrino spectra of fissile isotopes were
calculated, the corresponding detection rate, D(Ev), was
found using Equation 6. Here ρp is the proton density,
V is the detection volume,  is the detector efficiency, T
is the counting time, r is the distance from the detec-
tor to the reactor core, and φ is the antineutrino rate
derived from the fission rate in the reactor [2]. The sur-
vival probability, Pee, which accounts for the oscillation
of neutrino flavor is also accounted for. However, because
the detector is located 25 m from the reactor core the loss
of antineutrinos due to oscillations was negligible.
D(Ev) =
TρpV 
4pir2
σ(Ev)φ(Ev¯)Pee(Ev, r) (6)
Once the antineutrino is emitted there is no way to de-
termine which fissile isotope was responsible for its emis-
sion. Regardless, the count rate evolution and overall
detected antineutrino energy spectrum will still reflect
changes in inventory of fissile material in the reactor.
The IAEA set limits of concern for unaccounted nu-
clear material that can be used for the construction of a
nuclear device. In the case of 233U, the IAEA defines a
significant quantity to be 8 kg with a timeliness detection
goal of 30 days. Two cases are compared in the diversion
study: a baseline scenario in which the reactor is under
standard operation, and an anomalous scenario in which
a state is trying to divert 233U. The thorium molten salt
reactor used in this analysis reaches a 233Pa production
5TABLE II. Approximated 233U antineutrino spectra, and cor-
related uncertainties using the summation method.
Ev Nv σ
[MeV] [ν fission-1 MeV-1] [%]
2.00 9.45× 10−1 9.03
2.25 7.76× 10−1 10.0
2.50 6.34× 10−1 6.85
2.75 5.14× 10−1 9.39
3.00 4.10× 10−1 11.6
3.25 3.22× 10−1 13.3
3.50 2.54× 10−1 14.6
3.75 2.20× 10−1 13.2
4.00 1.58× 10−1 11.6
4.25 1.25× 10−1 10.6
4.50 9.90× 10−2 7.52
4.75 7.92× 10−2 12.5
5.00 6.25× 10−2 16.5
5.25 4.88× 10−2 18.7
5.50 3.77× 10−2 23.8
5.75 2.83× 10−2 23.6
6.00 2.07× 10−2 27.1
6.25 1.45× 10−2 36.7
6.50 9.62× 10−3 23.5
6.75 5.92× 10−3 19.9
7.00 3.53× 10−3 19.6
7.25 2.20× 10−3 24.5
7.50 1.36× 10−3 22.1
7.75 7.61× 10−4 17.6
8.00 3.91× 10−4 19.9
equilibrium of about 330 grams a day. In the anomalous
scenario the reactor has reached this equilibrium produc-
tion and 330 grams of 233U is diverted and replaced with
294.36 grams of 235U each day until a significant quantity,
8 kg, is obtained. The addition of 235U compensates for
the reactivity and power loss from diversion activity. The
evaluation for the analysis takes place at 4500 effective
full power days. For this diversion scenario, we assume
a proliferating party intends to minimize the amount of
time needed to divert material in order to maximize the
time between when a significant quantity is extracted and
when the anomalous activity can be detected. In this sce-
nario, t = 0 is when the diversion of 330 grams of 233U
begins. This continues for twenty-five days, at which
point the IAEA timeliness detection goal for this mate-
rial is thirty days [18]. The antineutrino evolution for
both the baseline and anomalous case will be evaluated
for 55 days assuming full power operation or until there
is a 95% confidence that material was diverted.
A. Spectral Analysis
A spectral based analysis was performed by compar-
ing the detected antineutrino spectra from the baseline
and anomalous scenarios defined in the previous section,
in order to determine the counting period required to
achieve a 95% confidence that a significant quantity of
material was diverted . This analysis observes the indi-
vidual contributions of each fissioning isotope in the reac-
tor to the overall detected antineutrino spectrum through
an energy binned maximum likelihood analysis for corre-
lated variables:
p =
1
(2pi)n/2
√
det(Σ)
exp
(
−1
2
AΣ−1AT
)
(7)
Here, A = [Mi −Bi, . . . ,Mn −Bn], compares the
measured counts, M , in each energy bin, n, against
the counts calculated in the baseline B; Σ represents
the variance-covariance matrix for the measured spectra,
and p defines the probability of an anomalous scenario.
Applying the statistics test to the antineutrino spectra
shown in Figure 5 resulted in an 87% confidence level
for anomalous activity. A counting period of of 86 days,
31 days past the IAEA timeliness detection goal, was re-
quired to meet the desired confidence level. The ROC,
receiver operating characteristic, curve shown in Figure
7 validates the strength of the test for the spectral anal-
ysis. The following section discusses the use of ROC in
more detail.
As shown in Fig. 1, the largest spectral difference be-
tween 233U and 235U occur at higher energies where the
uncertainties in the spectral shape are the largest. Re-
cent results from the Daya Bay experiment indicate that
a small number of beta-decay isotopes can explain the
presence of an anomalous bump in the antineutrino spec-
trum around 6-7 MeV [19]. In principle, this could have
implications to antineutrino detection for nuclear safe-
guards if the ”bump” was attributed to specific actinides.
However, our results don’t depend on the bump and that
a higher resolution detector with higher statistics would
be needed to exploit this still poorly understood feature.
.
Previous studies looking at the diversion of plutonium
have shown an excess of counts at higher energies, and a
deficit at lower energies due the shape of 239Pu and 241Pu
relative to 235U [20]. Because the antineutrino spectrum
of 233U lower than that of 235U at all energies, a spectral
analysis shows an excess of counts in each energy bin.
Additionally, results from this analysis can be improved
if the uncertainties due to counting statistics and the
predicted antineutrino emission were reduced.
B. Rate Evolution Analysis
In this analysis the antineutrino count rate evolution
in an anomalous scenario was compared to the expected
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FIG. 5. (Color online). Detected antineutrino energy spectra
integrated for the anomalous and baseline scenario over an 86
day counting period (top). Energy binned differences between
the anomalous and baseline scenario with statistical errors
(bottom).
antineutrino counts under standard operations (baseline)
using a hypothesis testing procedure [4]. Figure 6 shows
the count rate evolution in both the baseline and anoma-
lous scenarios along with the LS regression fit. The
antineutrino count rate for this thorium MSR shows a
smaller decline over time than that of the PWR seen in
Reference [4]. This MSR is refueled online with more fre-
quency than a PWR, as a result the reactivity of a reac-
tor, for a given thermal output, is primarily controlled by
the makeup fuel; whereas, in a PWR the boron concen-
tration of the coolant throughout a cycle indiscriminately
effects the actinides fission rate.
Once the antineutrino count rate was determined, a
quadratic fit using least square (LS) regression was ap-
plied to the rate. To eliminate dependencies between
the coefficients, the LS regression was performed on the
sample mean
(
t− t)as shown in Equation 8.
N
(B)
υ = β
(B)
0 + β
(B)
1
(
t− t)+ β(B)2 (t− t)2 (8)
Here the superscript are consistant with those used in the
spectral analysis. Comparing the coefficients β0, β1, and
β2 between the measured and baseline fit will indicate if
material has been diverted using the following hypothesis
test:
Hi0 : β
(M)
i = β
(B)
i vrs H
i
a : β
(M)
i 6= β(B)i (9)
Equation 9 can be determined using the following test
statistics,
si =
ˆ
β
(M)
i −
ˆ
β
(B)
i√
σ2(
ˆ
β
(M)
i ) + σ
2(
ˆ
β
(B)
i )
(10)
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FIG. 6. (Color online). Baseline (green) and anomalous sce-
nario (blue) evolutions of the antineutrino count rate in counts
per day over the fifty-five day period, along with the expected
count rate in the case of operator malice (red).The associated
errors in the count rates have been removed to show a direct
comparison of the count rates and calculated fits.
and the corresponding p value:
pi = 2 · P (S ≥ |si|) (11)
Here S has a Student’s t distribution with 2 · (n− 3) de-
grees of freedom, with n being the number of count rate
measurements and σ referring to the uncertainties in the
daily count rate. Although not included in this work, the
systematic uncertainties in the detector response and an-
tineutrino rate may be reduced if previous measurements
on this reactor can allow for template matching [4].
When applying the test to the count rate evolution,
two of the three coefficients reject the null hypothesis in
favor of the alternative hypothesis. The one coefficient,
β0, that showed no statistical difference was related to
the absolute antineutrino rate emission. This shows that
the test is not dependent on precise knowledge of the
expected count rate, but observes general trends (i.e. is
the count rate monotonically decreasing or not) in the
rate evolution.
To determine the robustness of the hypothesis tests
to statistical variations in LS coefficients, a Monte Carlo
simulation was used to generate one hundred thousand
anomalous and baseline detected antineutrino count rate
evolutions assuming a Gaussian distribution. An ideal
threshold for the true positive/false positive rate was
identified as 95%/5% . A true positive result was iden-
tified as the test correctly identifying an anomalous sce-
nario, while a false positive result indicated that the base-
line was incorrectly identified as an anomalous scenario.
Figure 7 shows the ROC curve for the rate analysis un-
der a 55 day counting period as well as the counting time
required to reach the desired TP/FP rate. Under the 55
day constraint, an 81%/5% TP/FP rate is achieved. The
desired rate is acheived by increasing the counting time
to 78 days.
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FIG. 7. (Color online). ROC curve for the count rate evo-
lution within the IAEA timeliness goal (blue) and when the
target TP/FP rate is met for both the count rate evolution
(green) and the spectral (purple). curve for The desired true
positive and false positive rate is plotted with dotted lines.
TABLE III. Sensitivity of the count rate evolution test using
Monte Carlo simulations. The results show the false positive
rate that would incur for a 5% false positive rate for both the
diversion scenario presented in the study, and a misreported
power shift.
Counting Diversion Scenario Misreported Power
Time TP/FP TP/FP
55 Days 81%/5% 58%/5%
78 Days 95% /5% 73% /5%
114 Days 99% /2% 95%/5%
When this procedure was applied to pressurized water
reactors to observe the diversion of plutonium, it could
not identify anomalous activity as quickly if the operator
misreported the thermal power output [4]. Because of
the transient growth of the antineutrino spectra caused
by the diversion of 233U, misreporting the reactor power
would not mask proliferation. Figure 6 shows the ex-
pected antineutrino count rate if the reactor was oper-
ating at a 7MW excess. Here the the β0 coefficients are
matched, requiring more time to detect material diver-
sion. After applying the same procedure, as mentioned
above, an anomalous scenario can be detected within 114
days in the presence of a false power report. Additionally,
the effects of misreported power shifts can give insight
to the test’s sensitivity to detector drifts. The detector
used in this analysis has not been deployed long enough
to study these effects, but the SONGS1 detector showed
a less than 1% drift while taking data [21].
V. CONCLUSION
The antineutrino emission from a thorium MSR was
analyzed to determine if the diversion of a significant
quantity of 233U could be observed within the IAEA
timeliness goal. In order to perform the analysis, we
calculated the antineutrino emission spectrum of 233U,
based on the fission product yields. Using a spectral and
rate-time based analysis the diversion 233U could be de-
tected 61 and 53 days after the diversion of 8 kg of 233U
respectively; in a total counting period of 86 and 78 days.
Usually a spectral analysis is more sensitive to diversion
than the rate-time analysis because it provides more in-
formation about the antineutrino emission. In this anal-
ysis the integral spectrum over the entire 55 day period
is being binned into a single histogram so the day to day
changes in the rate of each bin is averaged out.
Evaluating the antineutrino count rate gives insight
to the power level of the reactor, where analyzing the
detected antineutrino spectra is a reflection of its iso-
topic concentration. Although this method requires less
time, relying solely on the count rate makes the analy-
sis susceptible to operator malfeasance. When using the
antineutrino count rate, there is a trade off between ex-
ceeding IAEA timeliness goals and being sensitive to false
declarations of reactor power.
The test for material diversion was heavily dependent
on counting statistics. Desirable test performances are
attainable through feasible improvements to antineutrino
detectors, such as better instrumentation for small scale
antineutrino detectors or increasing the detector mass.
Addtionally, variations in thorium reactor designs may
also effect the sensitivity to diversion. Some models
incorporate scheduled refueling, reducing the counting
time from 55 days to 30 days; or utilize epithermal and
fast neutron energies, which would effect the antineutrino
emission from fission. Other designs incorporating solid
fuels do not separate the 233Pa from the blanket. This
changes the SNM from unirradiated direct use material
to irradiated use material, allowing for longer diversion
detection constraints.
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